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REPLY BRIEF
1.

Judicial Notiee.

He:,;pondents criticize appellants for calling to the
attention of the Court the report of a Congressional
Committee which embodied a report to such Committee
by the Governmental Agency charged with the responsibility of making the subsidy payments pursuant to
the Act of Congress.
1

Appellants are not conscious of any impropriety in
so <loing:
'J'}J.is Honorable Court will take judicial notice of
the trne :;lgnification of all English words and phrases,
of th<: public and private official acts of the legislative,
executive, and juclieial departments of the United States,
and of the political history of the world. In all such
cases "the Court may resort for its aid to appropriate
hooks or documents of reference." Section 104-46-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
''The courts may also take notice of the mischief the laws were intended to remedy and of the
public demand preceding their passage, and they
may, with propriety, recur to the history of the
times when the statute was passed to ascertain
the reason as well as the meaning of particular
provisions therein . . . ''
(20 Am . .Tur. Evidence, ~ 41)
'Phus in Outlet FJmbroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills, 254
N. Y. 179, 70 A.L.R. 1440, the Court took judicial notice
that at the time a contract for the sale of goods to be
imported was entered into, Congress was debating a new
tariff and that the debate continued for a year.
In earlier cases involving subsidy payments thi:,;
Honorable Court did take such notice of the actions
tnl<en hy the government during the course of the last
war, induding the premium payment plan. (Combined
\l etals Reductions Co. v. State Tax Commission, 176
P. 2d 614.)
2

2.

An Argument Exploded.

He1ipondent::> avoi<l rather than meet appellant:>'
argnwents by reiterating the premise of the former s;;b;-:j,::~ ta.·~ c:1ses. stating (p. 10):
"''' '' * T'hroughout tlw entire program, both
before Hule 13 was amended and aft.erward, t1w
premium payments were made as a part of the
aetual total price authorizer! and pursuant to the
premium price plan inaugnrated ,jointly by the
Ft~deral Loan Agency, the \Y ar Production Board
and the Office of Price Administration. ln other
words, under O.P.A. regulations made in conjunction wi.th the vVar Production Board the
prices permitted to be paid for the metals were
the ceiling prices plus the premium price. And
the two of them together constituted the selling
price of the ores and metals. The one was nevPr
divorced from the other. * ~· * " (Italics ours.)
One might think it strange for counsel to persist
m this contention on the basis of the information now
before the court in these cases, and the facts admitted
to he true by the demurrers below.
And when price controls were discontinued in 1945,
while the subsidies continued into 1947, how can respondents argne ''The one was never divorced from the
other"? Not even a shadow of basis for this argument
continued after metal price controls went out of the
window.
Respondents just beg the question in baldly assertmg (p. 10) that "the prices permitted to be paid for
the metals were the ceiling prices plus the premium
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price. And the two of them together constituted the
selling price of the ores and metals.''
:1.

The Basis For The Subsidies.

Appellants have never advanced the "absurd"
straw man that the subsidies-" so-calleu" by Congress
whicl1 anthorizecl tl1Pir payment-~were "outright gifts."

(P: 5, 7)

Y

On the contrary, appellants contend that the snhsidies paid were increased in direct ratio to the need of
each particular mine for more money than could be realized from a sale or conversion into money or i:ts equivalent of that mine's ores; they were paid, in the words of
Congress, "to obtain the maximum necessary production" from the mine\s of this country.

It follows that since such subsidies are the opposite
of 11roceeds from the sale of ores, and no part of the
value thereof, the payments may not be considered "in
arriving at a proper tax base."
Respondents at page 7 of their brief momentarily
recognize this when they aptly characterize such payments by quoting from a case in which one reason for
the allo,wance of bounties was given as '' product:ion or
manHfacture to be stimulated.''
4.

Respondents' Considerati')n of Revised Rule 13.
(P. 8)

Original Rule 13 of the quota committee provided
with respect to ores sold that premium payments would
4

be ''based upon metal paid for under settlement contrart:-; ". ( \V e assume the court will take judicial notice
or the faet that in the eases where ores are sold, the
:'a]p:-; are to lmyers under settlement contracts, i.e., contract:-; ~-qwci fying the basis of settlement.)
With respect to ores not so sold the rule provided
that premium payments would be based on stated pereentages of the metal content.
Tn the ease of Comhine1l Metals Redudion Co. et al
\ ~- : :, tate Tax Couuaissiuu, this Honorable Court, looking to the flrst part of the rule-that relating to ores
solr1--said it was self-evident that metals were not paid
for un(1er settlement contracts unless they were sold.
'Then the court added that since it appears (from the
records in those particular cases) that the "premium
priees'' paid to mining companies were for metals sold
h~- them, it followed that such premium prices were inclndablP as money received on a sale. The majority
of the court felt that eases where ores were not so sold
"-rre not then before this court.
The decision of the court was accordingly based
upon the quoted provision of Original Rule 13,
f()r the eourt recognized that under our statute the basis
for determining ·the amount of taxes due where there
has heen a sale of ore under a bona fide contract of
sale is the amount of money or its equivalent actually received from the sale.
square!~-

From the records m these cases now before the
eonrt involving ore sales it now appears that Original
Rule 13 was rescinded, anrl a new rule adopted under
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1\"]Jiel! subsidy payments were based on cert-ain stated
j)i'rrentages for the ,rcspecti1:e metals regardless of the
}Jcrccnta[JCS actually recovered or paid for.
Copies of the original and revised rules are attached
as f~Xl1ihits to the complaints. From these exhibits it
appears that under the Revised Rule, even in the case of
C'nstolll ores, payment of bounties was not "conditioned
(,;: a sale'' ;-itinclt less \\·e1·e such bountie::.; '' rccci\·erl on

a ;.;ale".
He;.;pondents would have the court ignore the rescission of old rule 1:~ and the adoption of a new and different rnle.
On page 10 of their brief respondents now recogni:~.e that under Original Rule l~ a different method of
C'Ollljmting premium payments was provided whe.re no
settlement contracts existed. Such method is set forth
in the in;.;tructions of Metals Reserve Company attached
as l<~xhibit D to the complaint ofthe United States Smelting Hefining and .Mining Company in Case No. 7324,
which exhibit, together with the copie8 of affidavits attached, show that bonuses ·were paid on the basis of
mim~ produetion records and before any sale.
In tlw same complaint it i8 alleged that such bonuses
were paid unconditionally and without any right on the
1mrt of the agency of the Federal Government paying
the same to receive hack the premiums paid in the event
the metals recovered from the ores for the production
of which snch subsidies were paid became lost, de;.;troyed,
were retained by the company or otherwise failed to
enter the channels of commerce. Yet respondents ask

the court to believe that such bonuses were received "on
On the same page respondents say there is nothill,'-(' to indicate that the purpose of making p1·emium
payments was changed by Amended Rule lil. vVe agree:
i/:c purpose of making such pa.yments was specified by
C'ol!,rtress, i.e., to obtai.n the rnaxirnum necessary produc/ioN.

The conditions of payment were, ho\Yever, within
saw fit to rescind that part of Rule 1:l requiring as a
eowlition of paylttent that certain ores be :o;old. H pre;;r;;·i)Ju1_ in lieu thereof thllt tk~ r:w1ntitie::; of metals
}JI"O(i~tccd be deter1nined, a~ tlte bat;is for subsid~y pay-

The Kennecott and Similar Situations.

Let us assume for this argument that Utah's statutes
in question should be construed broadly against the taxpa~·er; and thus that the I . egislature had in mind when
it used the particular words in these statutes that proeeed:,; or amounts realized from the sale of ores, etc.,
:,;lwul(1 inelude subsidies, bonuses or bounties, u)wn tied
iuto tl1e purchase price for tlie sale of these ores. This
apparently was the reasoning of the majority of the
<'Ourt in the Combined Metals and Haynes decisions
Jnu.;ed upon the records in the first series of cases subl '1i tted to this court.
Is this court now willing to press this line of rea-
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sonmg to the point of creating liability in cases such
as that of Kennecott, where no sale of the ores, on the
increased production of which the subsidies were computed and paid, eve.r took place at all?
In such cases the first part of Rule 13 never did
apply, either as originally promulgated and heretofore
relied on by this court, or after revision. Further, the
reconls in these cases now before the court, with the
material facts pleaded by appellants in cooperation with
counsel for respondents and admitted by demurrer,
show:
(a)
paid.

The precise basis on which the subsidies were

(b) That this basis was not the tons of ore :;old,
but the excess-over-quota production of ore.
(c) When the computations for subsidy payments
on such basis were made each month, the payments
occurred in due course entirely apart from the subsequent treatment and disposition of those excess ores.
For example are the familiar Kennecott souvenir beehives, where no sale has ever taken place even of the refined copper.
This indeed is a far cry from the other type of case
where the same smelter, buying the ores, paid to the
seller both the sales price and on behalf of the Government the subsidy as a premium price, both computed
on the same ores as (lelivercd and sold. If one is vvilling to abrogate the familiar rule of strict construction
in favor of the taxpayer, to assume a legislative pre-
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.:>c1ence anticipating then unknown conditions, and to
look to the particular administrative restrictions and
polil'ies in such cases rather than the intent of Congress
in its authorization for the payment of production
honm;es, then there is something to he said for tax liability in such cases.
But even so-a position which we re8pectfully submit is in error-in the entirely different 8ituations 8Uch
a8 tho8e of the United States Smelting Company and
Kennecott, is not the court being asked to legislate judicially under any standard, and frankly to rewrite these
tax 8tatute8 in the interest8 of a pos8ible need for increased revenue~
In their brief (p. 11) re8pondents do not and cannot meet this; so they avoid the entire argument by saying (1) these facts are "conclu8ions of law"; and (2)
the affidavit attached to the complaint shows by the selection of one word therein that the subsidy payments
were for the sale of the ore8.
\V e can only respectfully request the court to read
the concise, simple amended complaint-in effect the
(mtire record-in the Kennecott and similar cases, and
then treat respondents' evasive agnun0nt on it8 merit.
It is true that the one word of the particular affidavit
attached to the Kennecott complaint a8 illustrative was
not as otherwise throughout, changed from ''sold"; but
if this court is to pin its decision on that point in view
of the picture as otherwise pleaded and as was the fact,
Kennecott is willing to let the matter rest on the con8CJences of those concerned.
9

6.

The Inclusion of Subsidy Payments in Detennining
Net Pmceeds Valuation. (P. 13)

Although respondents so entitle the first subdivif!ion or their hrief as to purportedly refer to the inclusion of bonuses in determining the n1,ine occupation tax,
it will he noted that often the argument is <lirected
eqnall~' to such inclusion in arriving at net proceeds. \Ve
l1ave follO\\'ed respondents in this, since in large part
olwionsl;' U1e same rules are applicable.
Under subdivision 2 of their brief, respondents make
three points directed to the inclusion of premium payments in rleterrnining gross proceeds and thereby fixing
the assesserl value of mines. These are as follows:
n. "Under the Utah statutes the base for determining the taxes from mines includes what is annually
reali11ed from the product of the mine, over and above
the ('ost of expenses of obtaining· such proceeds and inrlu<les the value of the ore, etc., prodnce(l but not sold
dclring· the year."
1'his statement is obviously unwarranted in fact as
a reference to the statute will readily disclose. Only
when ores, produced hut not sold, have bPen conrerterl
h1f o the PrJnivalent of money are they to be included in
arriYing at net proceeds.
The one case dealing with this is that of Salt Lake
Connt~' vs. Utah Copper Co., 9:i Fed. 2d. 127, in which
the question was whether "blister copper", gold and
silver hull ion produced in the preceding calendar year
lmt remaining unsold, as well as the amount received
10

t'rom ::;ales in the preceding calendar year of ores produced, should be included in computing gross proceeds.
lt was not even contended that ores mined but not
::-;houl<l ::-;o he included. The Court held that
such blister eopper and gold and silver bullion should
he included, ::-;aying:
rn·oc<~:c;::-;e<l

" 'Blister enpper' i::-; eopper that has passed
tiJrouglJ the• i'lllelting process, rnetallie copper of'
a black hlistered surface, or final product of conYertinp: copper mattP, and is about !)G-9D per cent
pure. The simple meaning of' 'mom·~,, i:;; current
coin, hut it ma~, mean possessions expressible in
mone~, valnes. ':.\1 oney' lms no technical meaning,
hnt is of mnhiguous import, and may l>e interpret(~<l having reganl to all surrounding circumstancps under which it is used. ':.\foney' is often
and popularly used as equivalent to 'property'.
':M on<~.V' llleans \\'ealth reekoned in terms of
mone:·; eapital considered as a eash asset; speciiienlly such wealth or capital dealt in as a commodit~, to he loaned, invested, or the like; wealth
eonsidered as a ca::-;h asset. 'J;~quivalent' means
equal in value, force, measure, power, and effect,
or having equal or corresponding import, meaninr~, or l'ignificance; what is virtually the same
tl1in~;: id(~nti(•al in effect.'~ * *"
·' Bli:·der coprwr has an esiahlishefl and readily ascertainable market value, and when the taxing- authorities were apprisPd of the numher of
JHmnrls produce<l it was a simple matter to appraise its Yalue in money."
The eases eited hy respondents arc not in point. The
ease of Salt Lake County vs. Trtah Copper Co., 294 Fed.
199, in whieh the case of :.\f ercur Mining Co. vs ..Tuah
11

County cited by respondents and other cases were reviewed and considered, held, to the contrary of respondents' contention, that "the net annual proceeds of a mine
are the net proceeds of the sale of its product during
the tax year".
In that case it was contended by the County that the
statutes did not contemplate that tailings must be converted into cash before the proceeds tax would attach;
and the court held against the county. Yet this is the
anthority eited by respondents.
In the ease of Tintie f;tandard Mining Co. vs. Utah
Count~·, cited hy respondents, the issue was as to the
}ll'opriety of certain deductions from gross proceeds
taken by the mining company and disallowed by the
Board of IDqnalization. rrhe case did not involve any
(jllPstion of the inclusion in gross proceeds of ores produ('ed hut not sold.

l1. Respondents next say that notwithstanding the
alleQ:ations of the amended complaints here before the
eourt, the cases must he considered as though the premimn payments were made only after the ores had been
eom~erted into the equivalent o [ money.
l{espon<lents ignore Uw specific allegations as to how
these payments were made. For instance, in the case
of rnited States Smelting Refining and Mining Compan~·, No. 7i~24, is to be put aside: the exhibits showing
the instructions from Metals Reserve Company; the
monthl~· affidavits filed h~· the smelting company showing that the quantities of metal reported as available
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for the payment of premiums were determined by mine
production records; the allegations as to the manner
in which the ores were treated showing the processing
at the plant of the company at Midvale, Utah, the shipment of the resultant product for refining at other plants
outside the State of Utah, and the date of payment of
premiums with relation to such dates of processing and
refining; also the allegations that the premiums were
paid hefore 8ny sale of the ores, were paid unconditionally, and without any right on the part of the federal
a~~ency paying the same to recover them or any part
thereof in the event the ores were never sold.
Respondents ignore all this to look only to an allegation quoted at page 14 of their brief in which it was
succintly stated that monthly quotas were computed and
premiums were paid on a specified percentage of the
metal contents of the qualified materials in the ores, and
that such metal contents were determined by sampling
and assaying hefore any conversion of the ores and before an~r processing of the ores other than such crushmg 1s as required to permit of sampling for assaying.
This allegation respondents say is a mere "conelusion of law". The allegation is one of fact as to the
time when certain things were done; it would be as
much a conclusion of law to say that one had breakfast
before having lunch.
But respondents say that the very question to be
determined here is whether or not there was a conversion of ores into money or the equivalent of money.
That is not the ultimate question to be determined:

13

the quet.ltion before this court is whether or not the
honut.les paid were any part of the grost.l proceeds realized from the sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of ores produced by appellants. "\Ve submit that under
the admitted facts pleaded in these cases now before
the court, it cannot seriously be contended that the subsidies were any part of such gross proceeds.
c. Finally, respondents argue that it is immaterial
whether the oret.l were converted or sold; and "When
the oret.l were taken out of the mine and were sent to
the smelter or mill, such ores immediately had a value
in addition to their ceiling price, namely, the amount
which was payable for such ores as premium payments".
( p. 17)
Here again respondents simply beg the question as
to whether the subsidies were some part of the payment
made for the ores; or on the contrary were, as the Emergen('y Price Control Act of 1942 authorized, as every rule
issued (except one rescinded portion of original Rule
13), and as every act done evidences, bonuses paid by
Oovernment to ensure maximum production of certain
fitrategic materials, paid because the amounts realizable
from the particular operations of a particular mine were
not sufficient to cover costs and ensure continued maxinmm production.

7.

The Constitutional Question. (P. 19)

l{espondents state that they are content to rest the
que::-;tion of the constitutionality of the inclusion of
premium payments in computing the net proceeds tax

14

valuation npon the decision of this court in "the Haynes
case''.

1t 1s true that in the Haynes case this Honorable
Conrt (lid consider on the frzcts there presented the constitntionalit;; of the inclusion of ;mch premium payments.

Tt will be remembered that in the Haynes case this
lf onora hie Court sai(l that there either the premi'mts
w0y·e r0eeived only on a ~mle of the ores or were received
only after the ores had been converted into the equivalent
of money; and therefore the subsidies were properly
treated as part of the proceeds from the mine.
In the Haynes case no question of subsidies other
than premiums payab1e under the initial quotas established was presented. The court did not then have, as it
now has, the full story of the basis on which subsidies
were paid; the determination and revision of quotas,
the reports reqnired from each individual mining company showing its own costs of operation and planned
developn:ent; the elaborate calculations by the federal
agencies required to estimate the subsidies needed to be
made to each mining company in order to make up
the deficits over and above the amounts receivable from
mine operations and permit of continued operations; the
times and conditions of payment, as for instance, retroactive payments to make up for increased labor costs;
and the reduction in quotas and consequently in subsidies
paid when either through increased production or reduced costs a mine more nearly carried itself.
Upon the records here presented, it is submitted
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that premium payments, so-called, made under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
anthorizing the making of snbsidy payments when neces~ar.\· to ohtain maximum necessary production of any
commodity, are clearly no part of the amount received
on either a sale of ores, or on the conversion of ores
into the equivalent of money. On the contrary, the subf;idies were what had to be added to all such receipts to
TH'nnit of continued mine operation.
\Vp submit that the question of the constitutionality

ol' tl1P inclm.;ion of such subsid~· pa~'ments in the measnre
of value should be reviewed and considered by this HonorablE> Court. N mv that tlw true nature of the subsidies
is diselosc<l to this eourt, it would well appear that they
were no more a part of the valu.e of each mining property
than a $f:I.OO bount;· for killinp; the animal would remake the coyote's $1.00 pelt into a $G.OO value. True,
tlw owner-killer mir~ht realize $6.00 by collecting the
hounty and selling the pelt to the furrier; but the proeeerls from the sale of the pelt would remain the same,
hP the bounty what it may.
He::.;peetfully submitted,
CHENI1JY, MAHR, \VILKINS & CANNON,
Attor·neys for Cl1iP.f Consolidated Mining
Company and Un/ited 8tatP.s Smelting
Re finlin,r; and Mining Company
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Park Utah Consolidated
Mines Company
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Attorney for Silver King Coalition Mines
Company

C. C. PARSONS,
WM. l\1. McCREA,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BgHLE,
Attorneys for /( ennecott Copper Corporation
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